The likely cause of Blackout was a very strong oscillation in the power network and the leading cause of strong oscillating was the high share of renewable energy sources. After Blackoutt, there were critical voices in the face of a quick departure from conventional energy.
The Spanish electrical network supports a population of about 44 million people and the peak load is about 40 GW. The system has an impressive installed power over 125 GW, with renewable energy playing a significant role of about 32 GW from solar solar and 31 GW from the wind. The remaining part comes mainly from gas, hydronergy and nuclear energy. The Spanish transmission network maintains connections with three neighboring regions: France (2.8 GW import power), Portugal (2.1 GW import power and 3.9 GW of export power) and Morocco (600 MW of import power and 900 MW of export power).
A smaller Portuguese network supports a population of about 11 million people with a peak load of 9 GW. The Portuguese system is mostly based on water energy, with about 8.3 GW of hydroelectric power and significant resources of the peak-pump warehouses. Its transmission network is well integrated with Spain through many 400 kV connections, which allows both countries to act strictly synchronized.
At the time of the incident on April 28, the Iberian Peninsula was in relatively normal working conditions. The load was about 25 GW in Spain and 8 GW in Portugal. The weather conditions were favorable, it was sunny, without faults, although a strong wind was blowing on the southern peninsula. The system used a rainy spring, which caused a high water level in water reservoirs. However, several large generators underwent seasonal maintenance. In the meantime, at the time of the event, a significant amount of PV solar energy was supplied to the network. Failures began with a sudden loss of 2.2 GW of power in substations in Granada, research and Seville. This initiated the domino effect, leading to automatic disconnections from the network and a vast break in the supply of energy. Government analysis in Spain includes reports on voltage fluctuations in the days preceding Blackout. One of the hypotheses is excessive tension as a possible reason for turning off the generators.
Probable cause of Blackout in Spain and Portugal
Probably the reason for this event was a very strong oscillation in the power network and the leading cause that could contribute to strong oscillating was the high share of renewable energy sources, which caused a high fluctuation in the energy generation, because by definition renewable energy is unstable and depend on weather conditions.
Strong oscillation in the power network means significant voltage or frequency fluctuations, which can be caused by various factors, such as sudden changes in energy demand, problems with generators or damage to energy lines. These fluctuations can lead to problems with energy quality, damage to electrical devices or even power outages. According to Red Electrica de Espana (Ree), 78% of the energy generated at that time came from renewable energy and the intermittent nature of the work, according to many experts, could be the main cause of the system instability. Lack of quick response to sudden fluctuations in renewable energy and demand fluctuations could cause a cascade breakdown that led to Blackout.
Balearia, where conventional power plants and heat and power plants are located have not been affected by the effects during the delivery breaks.
In the ERAA 2024 report (European assessment of resources adequacy) prepared by ENTSO-E (European network of electricity transmission operators), the potential risk of interruptions in electricity supplies in Spain was indicated, precisely due to the lack of production in the event of a failure in conventional sources and based on renewable energy production.
After Blackoutt, there were critical voices in the face of a quick departure from conventional energy. Some experts and opposition indicate a possible lack of so -called network inertia ("grid INERTIA"), caused by a limited share of nuclear and carbon power plants, as a factor that makes system stability. Spain plans to turn off the last nuclear reactors by 2035 but after Blackout, he is considering withdrawing from this decision. In a report published in 2023, the system needs of the ENTSO-E operator Association wrote that along with the termination of various types of thermal power plants, the sensitivity of energy systems will increase, which will be exposed to "significant changes in frequency and even Blackout, with relatively small unevenness between the production of energy and its reception"
The investigation was initiated to examine the causes of its final results at the end of June and also the European Commission conducts our investigation, the results of which we have to know at the end of the year.
Is Poland threatened with Blackout?
For now, renewable energy still has coverage in reserve carbon and gas units. We should keep this condition at least until the construction of nuclear and large -scale energy storage power plants.
Particularly in addition to securing the possibility of further functioning in the coal power system and supplementing them, as needed, gas units, the modernization of electricity networks, investments in modern energy -flow monitoring and management systems, which will respond to challenges related to the development of distributed sources.
The Polish electricity networks, together with other European operators, are looking for challenges for the security of deliveries. Inertia in the electricity for decades was provided by synchronous generators in conventional and nuclear power plants. Virming at the appropriate speed of mass are one of the foundations of the system function. Renewable energy sources do not have them, and it is the fastest more than these powers.
It is necessary to introduce coordinated planning and control of renewable energy sources and conventional energy as part of the energy transmission and distribution system.
The Polish Committee of Electricity rightly postulates that the reserve powers in Poland are excluded from the ETS.
